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Available online xxxxThis paper aims to evaluate the impact of 1998 Chinese health care reform on out-of-pocket
expenditure and on saving. Existing evidence on the results achieved by this reform in terms of
reduction of out-of-pocket medical expenditures is still mixed and contradictory, and very little
is known about the impact of these measures on the consumption and saving behavior of the
Chinese population. To shed more light on this issue we use data collected in 1995 and 2002 by
the ChineseHousehold Income Project (CHIP). Contrary to previous evidence, ourfindings suggest
that the effects of the reform have beenmore articulated and heterogeneous. In fact, we find that
once properly accounting for income distribution and unobserved heterogeneity (potentially
induced by health status), out-of-pocket medical expenses and saving rate are affected by the
reform in a differentiated way. In particular, we find that out-of-pocket expenses decrease only
for high income individuals with good health status and the saving rate increases only for low
income individuals with good health status. This result is actually worrisome, as it suggests that
the public health coverage after the reform provides financial protection only to individuals that
are relatively better off (with good health status and/or high income).
© 2015 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.JEL classification:
D14
I13
P36
Keywords:
China
Health insurance
Health care system reform
Household saving
Out-of-pocket expenditures1. Introduction
The characterization of the determinants of households' saving decisions is important both for providing a framework to explain
household wealth accumulation per se, as well as for providing valuable information on a variety of welfare policies. Given the large
size of the Chinese economy and its importance at the international level, considerable effort has been devoted in the economic
literature to understand Chinese households' saving decisions.
In the '70s, China has launched several reforms affecting the economy and, in particular, the social security system. The main
objective of these reforms was to transform China's stagnant, impoverished and centrally planned economic system into a more
flexible and decentralized system capable of generating sustained economic growth and increasing thewell-being of Chinese citizens.
The reforms began in 1978 and occurred in two stages. The first stage, between the late '70s and the early '80s, involved the de-
collectivization of agriculture, the opening up of the country to foreign investments, and the permission for entrepreneurs to start
up businesses. However, most industries remained state-owned. The second stage of the reform, between the late '80s and the
'90s, involved the privatization and contracting out of much state-owned enterprises (SOEs) and the removal of price controls,
protectionist policies, and redundant regulations, although state monopolies in sectors such as banking and petroleum remained+39 0412349176.
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2 V. Atella et al. / China Economic Review xxx (2015) xxx–xxxstate-owned. Following these changes, the private sector grew remarkably, accounting for as much as 70% of China's GDP by 2005,
reaching a figure larger than the GDP of Western nations. Along with the economic reform, the period between the end of the '80s
and the middle of the '90s was characterized by low real interest rate which might have induced an increase in saving rate, given
the borrowing constraints faced by households and small enterprises (Aaberge & Zhu, 2001; Modigliani & Cao, 2004; Nabar, 2011).
Within the same period, the Chinese government also implemented a series of reforms in the social security sector, including the
pension system.
The saving rate of urban Chinese households was basically flat before the '70s, but it started to increase as from 1978, until the be-
ginning of the '90s and reached a percentage as high as 35% of GDP (Modigliani & Cao, 2004). The average saving rate of urban house-
holds relative to their disposable income rose from 17% in 1995 to 24% in 2005 (Chamon & Prasad, 2011; Yang, Zhang, & Zhou, 2010).
Several studies, based on classicalmodels of saving have been used to explain the pattern of consumption/saving in developedmarket
economies. In particular, well established models, such as the Modigliani–Brumberg's life-cycle theory and Friedman's permanent-
income hypothesis, are taken into account as theoretical ground to try to explain the Chinese household's saving behavior. However,
the results predicted by these theories are not supported by the findings of empirical studies on the Chinese household saving behav-
ior (Chow, 1985;Modigliani & Cao, 2004; Qian, 1988;Wang, 1995). One challenging fact that hardly reconciles with the life-cycle the-
ory is the age-savingprofile of the Chinese household: it shows aU-shapedpattern (Brugiavini,Weber, &Wu, 2013; Chamon&Prasad,
2011), which is inconsistent with the hump-shaped pattern predicted by the life-cycle hypothesis. Moreover, empirical studies have
provided evidence of the increased uncertainty related to income and consumption induced by the economic sector reforms and, as a
consequence, an increase of precautionary savings (Kraay, 2000; Ma & Yi, 2010). Other studies using a simple growth model have
shown that uninsured risk induced by the economic transition partially altered the relation between the marginal propensity to
consume and the permanent income. Instead of consuming, the high income households prefer to save more (Wang & Wen, 2011;
Wen, 2010).
The aimof this paper is to focus on the health care system reformundertaken in 1998 and on its potential effects on household out-
of-pocket expenses and saving. We extend the descriptive analysis provided by Atella, Brugiavini, Chen, and Pace (2014) to investi-
gate, through an econometric analysis, the causal relationship between the health care reform and out-of-pocket expenses and saving.
To the best of our knowledge, this is the first contribution addressing together these research questions.
Within this literature, several authors have investigated the effect of various determinants of household saving rate (Brugiavini
et al., 2013; Chamon & Prasad, 2011; Choukhmane, Coeurdacier, & Jin, 2013; Feng, He, & Sato, 2011; Wei & Zhang, 2011) but to
date there are no contributions studying the relationship between the health care reforms and saving using microdata. The only
two papers that focus on the relationship between saving rates and the reforms occurred in the health care sector are Barnett and
Brooks (2010) and Baldacci et al. (2010), but they use macrodata and cannot assess the role of heterogeneity.3 On the contrary,
there are several contributions studying the relationship between the health care reforms and out-of-pocket expenditure (see for
example Liu & Zhao, 2006; Yip & Hsiao, 2009; Wagstaff & Lindelow, 2008; Liu, Rao, Wu, & Gakidou, 2008), although the results are
a bit mixed.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2 reviews the institutional background of the health care system;
Section 3 describes the data, the econometric model and the estimation results. Finally, Section 4 concludes.
2. The health care sector reform in urban China
Before 1998, the Chinese urban health insurance system consisted mainly of two insurance schemes: i) the Labor Insurance
Schemes (LIS) that bore all costs of medical treatment, medicine and hospitalization for the workers and for their dependents; and
ii) theGovernment employee Insurance Scheme (GIS) underwhichmedical costswere covered by government budgetary allocation.4
While GIS and LIS have played an important role in providing China's urban working population with health protection, several
aspects of the original schemes contributed to China's rapid health care cost inflation and inefficient resource allocation. First of all,
GIS and LIS were third-party insurance, providing comprehensive benefits with minimal cost sharing. Second, insured individuals re-
ceive largely free outpatient and inpatient services. This limited consumer financial responsibility for the health services utilization
induced over-utilization of health care services. Moreover, both GIS and LIS beneficiaries seek medical services from public hospitals,
which are usually reimbursed on a fee-for-service basis according to a government-set fee schedule. This system gives providers
incentive to over-provide services (Liu, 2002).
For this reason, during the '80s, China started to implement awhole series of reforms in the urban health insurance system. During
the first stage of the reforms (early '80s to 1991) the primary objective was cost containment andmajor reformmeasures include the
introduction of demand-side cost sharing and, on the supply side, more controls on the provider's activities. During the second stage
(1992–1998), the health sector reforms addressed the issue of inadequate risk pooling. Two cities in Jiangxi and Jiansu Province began
pilot reforms that used a combination of individual savings accounts and social risk-pooling funds to finance medical expenditures.3 Barnett and Brooks (2010) pool provincial data in China from 1994–2008 to exploit variations in provincial spending onhealth and differences in saving rates. Their
results suggest a statistically significant negative relationship betweengovernment health spending and saving inurban areas. Baldacci et al. (2010) examine the impact
of expanding social programs on household consumption in China. They simulate the effects of alternative government social expenditure reforms on aggregate con-
sumption using estimates of the age-specific marginal propensities to consume for different income groups and estimates of the lifetime amount of resources available
to each cohort. They find that a 1 percentage point of GDP increase in social expenditures allocated across pension, education and health would result in a permanent
increase in household consumption of 1.2% of GDP.
4 In this section we provide a short description of the health care system before and after the reform undertaken in the 1998. More details are provided byWagstaff,
Yip, Lindelow, and Hsiao (2009) and by Atella et al. (2014), to which we refer interested readers.
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3V. Atella et al. / China Economic Review xxx (2015) xxx–xxxBefore an individual could access the social risk-pooling fund, however, he or she must first pay deductibles from a first tier of
individual medical savings account and a second tier of direct deductible equal to 5% of annual income.
At the end of 1998, the Chinese government established a social insurance program for urban workers that replaced the existing
LIS and GIS in the cities, known as Basic Insurance Scheme (BIS). The program is financed by premium contributions from employers
(6% of the annual employee's wage) and employees (2% of their annual wage).5 Retired workers are exempt from premium contribu-
tions and the cost of their contributions is to be borne by their former employers.6 Compared with the old GIS and LIS, the new pro-
gram expands coverage to private enterprises and smaller public enterprises. Moreover, self-employed workers are allowed to enter
the program. However, compared with the old system of GIS and LIS, the benefit structure under the new system has twomajor gaps
in coverage. First, the dependents of the urbanworkers, who used to receive partial coverage, are no longer covered. Second, the new
system has a ceiling on the insured amount of the individual medical expenditures (equivalent to four times the annual averagewage
in the region). Imposition of this ceiling is due to budget constraints as well as the political emphasis on the wide coverage, but it
leaves most catastrophic illnesses uncovered.
TheMinistry of Labor and Social Security (1999) estimated that the premiumcontribution based on the 8% of the currentwage can
only cover about 70% of the total outlay under the old systems of GIS and LIS. Moreover, Gao, Raven, and Tang (2007) show that the
proportion of elderly covered by health insurance in urban China has declined over the period 1998–2007. 73. Data and empirical analysis
The empirical analysis of this paper is based on cross-sectional data obtained from the Chinese Household Income Project surveys
(CHIPs) conducted by the Chinese Academy of Social Science (CASS) in 1988, 1995 and 2002. The surveys use sub-samples from the
main nationally representative household survey program conducted by the Chinese National Bureau of Statistics in the urban and
rural areas, and are designed to be representative of the whole Chinese population. For the scope of our analysis, we only focus on
the 1995 and 2002 waves that represent respectively the pre-reform and post-reform periods. We exclude from the analysis the
1988wave because there are incomplete information on income and expenditure. Furthermore, we do not consider the rural sample
because the Basic Insurance Scheme (BIS)was introduced only in the urban areas.8 The urban sample included individuals and house-
holds from 11 provinces andmunicipalities.9 The purpose of CHIPs urban data collection was to measure the distribution of personal
income. Moreover, the data provide a large set of information on each household member concerning his/her social and economic
status, including employment characteristics, wage, tax, and sources of income, and demographic variables such as, age, gender,
marital status, relationship to the household head. Information is also gathered on household's expenditures and on their living
conditions. 103.1. Data description
The empirical analysis will be performed at household level, with some information collected at the head of the household level
(socio-demographic and employment characteristics) and some other at the household level (income, expenditures and saving).
Given the current structure of the Chinese health care assistance and our focus on saving behavior, we restrict the sample to include
only household heads aged 25–65, andwe exclude household headswho are self-employed, employedwithout contract or employed
with short and temporary term contract (in total 434 observations). Moreover, to avoid potential measurement errors, we dropped
the extreme values of the saving rate (values of the saving rate below the first percentile and above the 99th percentile). After
performing these selectionswe obtain a sample of 6445 households in 1995 and 5869 households in 2002. However, for our empirical
analysis the sample size reduces to 5305 households in 1995 and to 4194 in 2002, as the survey contains a non-negligible number of
missing values for the income and some employment characteristic variables used as regressors.
Table 1 reports the summary statistics (based on the final sample) of the variables used in the empirical analysis.5 The amount of the employer's contribution was different across provinces and cities. The average contribution level was 6% of the employee's wage.
6 Liu (2002) provides an extensive description of the characteristics of BIS.
7 This may be attributed to the reform of state-owned enterprises, which has resulted in many enterprises being closed and a substantial number of workers being
laid off (Gao et al., 2001). As only theminimum living allowancewas guaranteed, the elderlywhowere laidoff orwhose employing enterpriseswere closed as a result of
the ongoing economic reforms process may have lost their entitlements, such as the health insurance.
8 In our view using the rural sample as control group may not represent a good identification strategy for at least two reasons. First, the health insurance system in
urban and rural areas are completely different andwere alwaysmanaged as two completely different sectors (Atella et al., 2014; Brown, De Brauw, & Yang, 2009; Carrin
et al., 1999; Gao et al., 2007; Liu, 2002). Second, since the beginning of the economic reform and also during the period 1995–2002 (the study period of the current
paper) the rural and urban areas have been affected by different reforms of the economic andwelfare system or by the same kind of reform but undertaken in different
years and under different rules (e.g. the “one child policy”, the pension reform, etc.).
9 In the 1995 wave, the 11 provinces and municipalities are Anhui, Beijing, Gansu, Guangdong, Henan, Hubei, Jiangsu, Liaoning, Shanxi, Sichuan, and Yunnan. In the
2002wave, Chongqingmunicipality is also included. Since itwas one of the cities of Sichuan province and became themunicipality in 1997, we combine Chongqing and
Sichuan together in the 2002 wave. These 11 provinces and municipalities cover all the 6 geographical areas and can reflect the economic situation of China. In 2002,
Guangdong ranked the first in GDP and Beijingmunicipality ranked the first in per capita GDP, whereas Gansu ranked the 25th in GDP over all the Chinese 31 provinces
and was one of the lowest per capita GDP all over the country; Liaoningwas heavy industry center, where petrochemical industry, machinery manufacturing industry
andmetallurgy industry occupied 70% of total Liaoning gross industrial output value;Henanwas themost important agriculture province, where cultivated area ranked
the first all over the country (National Bureau of Statistics of China, 2003).
10 In the 2002 wave, CHIPs provide two special data sets which investigate rural-to-urban migrant individual and household information. However, such data do not
exist in the 1995 wave. Therefore we do not take these rural-to-urban migrant households into account in our analysis.
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Table 1
Household income, expenditure, saving rate and OOP expenses.
Variable 1995 2002 t-Stat
Total household disposable income 5092.3 7444.9 36.74
Total household expenditures 4248.8 5528.5 27.56
Saving rate 13.3 22.2 17.20
OOP medical expenses 125.6 348.9 17.37
OOP medical expenses-income ratio 0.025 0.047 12.66
Notes: The total household disposable income, household expenditure and the out-of-pocket expenses are reported in 2011 US dollar. The fourth column
shows the absolute t-value of a standard test of mean difference across the two surveys. Data source: Chinese Household Income Project (1995, 2002) and
authors' calculations.
4 V. Atella et al. / China Economic Review xxx (2015) xxx–xxxThemeasure of disposable income thatwe focus on includes labor income, property income, transfers, and income fromhousehold
sideline production minus income tax. The consumption expenditure variable covers a broad range of categories.11 Out-of-pocket
medical expense is defined as thedifference between total household's health care expenditure and the amount of the reimbursement
by any kind of health insurance. Furthermore, we measure savings as the difference between disposable income and consumption
expenditure and we define the saving rate as the ratio between saving and disposable income. All flow variables are expressed in
2011 U.S. dollars, PPP adjusted, and nominal variables in 2002 are deflated using the national CPI (base year 1995 = 100).
An important feature of the data used in the analysis is worth to be discussed: our key variables may suffer from measurement
error. Indeed, individuals may tend to under-report their own income, consumption expenditure and the reimbursement received
from the health insurance. As a consequence, our measures of household saving and out-of-pocket expenditure may be biased. In
particular, if the underestimation of income is lower than that of consumption expenditure, and if reimbursement is underreported,
ourmeasures of saving and out-of-pocket expenditure may be overestimated. The problems that originated in the empirical analyses
by measurement error in income and consumption are widely known among researchers and there are several contributions in the
literature that discuss these issues. Although this is not the right place where to speculate on such issues, it is worth mentioning
that Moore, Stinson, andWelniak (2000) and Pedace and Bates (2000) have produced a comprehensive review on themeasurement
issue in income variables. Similarly, Attanasio, Battistin, and Ichimura (2004), Attanasio andWeber (2010), Battistin (2003), Crossley
andWinter (2012), and Pudney (2008) have reviewed the same issues on the consumption side.Moreover, a paper byCifaldi andNeri
(2013) studies the issue ofmeasurement error in household survey for both income and consumption expenditure. Concerning China,
only few papers have pointed out the possible underestimation of China's household consumption (among the others,Wang & Zhang,
2009; Perkins, 2012; Zhang & Zhu, 2014). Most of these papers agree on the underestimation of household consumption and some
have tried to estimate the extent of the error (Peng et al., 2012; Zhu & Zhang, 2012). Unfortunately, to the best of our knowledge,
there are no studieswhich focus specifically on the issue of heterogeneity in the underestimation of consumption and reimbursement.
Moreover, we did not find any study on the correlation between measurement error and insurance type in China.
However, we believe that the potential under-reporting of reimbursement and consumption and the consequent overestimation
of out-of-pocket expenditure and saving rates could be a major problem in our empirical analysis only if the bias is heterogeneous
across the sample. We will carefully address this point from an empirical point of view in Section 3.2.
Conditional on these caveats on the quality of the data, in Table 1we observe that, on average, the household's total and disposable
income increased significantly in real terms from 1995 to 2002. Accordingly, also the household total expenditure increased signifi-
cantly, even though the rate of growth of expenditure is lower than what we observe for the income variables. Moreover, the average
out-of-pocketmedical expenses increased significantly from1995 to 2002which is consistentwith thefindings of Gao, Tang, Tolhurst,
and Rao (2001) andWagstaff and Lindelow (2008). Finally, the average ratio between out-of-pocketmedical expenses and disposable
incomewas 0.025 in 1995 (ranging from0 to 0.97) and 0.047 in 2002 (ranging from0 to 3.36). The household saving rate and the ratio
betweenout-of-pocketmedical expenses and disposable incomeare the dependent variables in the econometric analysis presented in
the next section.
There are several possible explanations for the increase in total household expenditure, but in our paper we focus on two main
reasons. First, in 1995 the health care costs of the LIS and GIS beneficiaries' dependents could be partially reimbursed, whereas in
2002 BIS did not reimburse the dependents' health care costs any more. Second, during this period there was a remarkable health
care cost increase, which leads to higher household health care expenses. Moreover, the proportion of the public insurance coverage
decreased from 1995 to 2002 significantly. This result is not surprising, since theMinistry of Labor and Social Security (1999) reported
that BIS could only cover 70% of the total outlay under GIS and LIS. This may be attributed to the reform of SOEs which has resulted in
many enterprises being closed and a substantial number of workers being laid-off (Gao et al., 2001).
Table 2 and Fig. 1 provide information on the average saving rate by age group. For all age groups the saving rate is higher in 2002.
Moreover, in bothwaves, the saving rate has aU-shapepattern. Coherentlywith previous empirical analyses run by Yang et al. (2010),
Chamon and Prasad (2011) and Brugiavini et al. (2013)we alsofind that the lowest saving rate levels are registered among the 30–44
age group in 1995 and among the 35–49 age group in 2002.11 Consumption expenditure includes food, clothing and footwear, household appliances, goods and services,medical care and health, transport and communications,
recreational, educational and cultural services and housing.
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Table 3
Descriptive statistics of saving rate by public health insurance coverage, survey year and age groups.
Saving rate 1995 2002
Coverage No coverage t-Stat Coverage No coverage t-Stat
All age groups 13.1 13.7 0.78 23.3 19.2 4.49
25–29 14.5 16.5 0.69 22.7 18.5 0.71
30–34 10.4 14.7 2.24 23.9 24.5 0.25
35–39 12.5 12.9 0.28 20.2 17.1 1.57
40–44 11.2 10.7 0.32 21.3 17.1 2.04
45–49 12.8 13.3 0.28 22.7 18.3 2.33
50–54 15.8 16.3 0.20 27.8 21.4 2.38
55–59 16.6 17.1 0.14 28.8 21.3 1.92
60–65 16.0 13.0 0.99 24.6 24.2 0.04
Notes: The fourth and the seventh columns show the absolute t-value of a standard test of mean difference across the two surveys. Data source: Chinese Household
Income Project (1995, 2002) and authors' calculations.
Table 2
Descriptive statistics saving rate by survey year and age groups.
Saving rate by age group All samples 1995 2002 t-Stat
25–29 16.9 15.2 22.2 2.04
30–34 16.6 11.6 24.1 8.57
35–39 15.7 12.6 19.3 5.78
40–44 15.0 11.0 20.2 8.11
45–49 17.7 12.9 21.5 7.06
50–54 21.4 16.0 26.4 6.94
55–59 20.5 16.7 27.1 5.23
60–65 16.3 15.2 24.6 2.35
Notes: The fifth column shows the absolute t-value of a standard test of mean difference across the two surveys. Data source: Chinese Household Income Project (1995,
2002) and authors' calculations.
5V. Atella et al. / China Economic Review xxx (2015) xxx–xxxAnother interesting aspect is to explore the evolution of saving rate by type of insurance coverage. In China, the household head
can be covered either by public insurance, private insurance, or can remain uninsured. According to the data collected, in the 1995
wave, public insurance was provided by either LIS or GIS, whereas in the 2002 wave it was provided only by BIS. In 1995, 71.12% of
household heads were covered by LIS or GIS, 16.97% was covered by private health insurance, while the remaining 11.91% of house-
holds heads were not covered by any kind of health insurance. In 2002, 73.63% of household heads were covered by BIS, 5.32% was
covered by private health insurance while the remaining 21.05% of households heads were not covered by any kind of health
insurance.
Table 3 shows the average saving rate by survey, public health insurance coverage and age groups. It is clear that in 2002 the saving
rate is significantly higher for households whose household heads were covered by public health insurance and in the 40–59 age
group. No statistically significant differences can be found in 1995 with the only exception of the 30–34 age group.12 Fig. 2 shows
the saving rate profile by age group and working unit type. We consider two categories of households, those with the household
head working in the private sector (employed in a private enterprise) and those with the household head not working in the private
sector (thereforeworking either in public enterprises – State Owned Enterprises (SOE) at central or provincial level or local SOE – or in
government agencies or in public institutions). This figure shows that the saving rate pattern is smoother for employees not working
in the private sector. Moreover, while in 1995 the saving rate difference for thoseworking in the private sector vs those notworking in
the private sector was not statistically significant, in 2002 it became significantly higher.
Fig. 3 shows the saving age profile by age group and characteristics of the job contract. In particular, we consider two categories of
households, those with the household head permanently employed in a working unit and those without a permanent contract. The
figure shows that, in both waves, the saving rate of permanently employed household heads is always higher than the saving rate
of the households head with different employment contract.
Finally, descriptive statistics of other relevant variables are reported in Table 4. We consider the gender and age of the household
head, the household composition (number of household members aged less than 25, 25–49, 50+), the head's years of education and
home ownership, and the employment characteristics, including working years in the current work place, permanent employed or
not, working in any enterprises or not, type of occupation and economic sectors. The data show that years of education and home12 The data may seem puzzling at first glance but we think there are some clear explanations. First, individuals with health insurance tend to have in average higher
propensity to consume health services. The reduction of the generosity of health insurance might have induced these individuals to increase their savings for precau-
tionary reasons. Second, individualswith health insurance have on average also higher income than thosewithout health insurance.Moreover, the difference in income
between individuals without coverage and with coverage increased over time, from 21% in 1995 to 37% in 2002. Given that there is a well known relationship between
saving rate and household income, the widening of the income differences between the two groups may have contributed to generate the evidence shown in Table 3.
Third, we notice that the values reported in Table 3 are simply unconditionalmean; as for the case of income, there are other variables correlatedwith the propensity to
save that might have experienced different dynamics in the two groups of individuals (covered and not covered).
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Table 4
Descriptive statistics.
Variable 1995 2002 t-Test
Gender of head of HH: male 0.66 0.69 2.59
Age of head of HH 43.60 43.45 0.81
No. of HH members 0–24 1.03 0.88 12.95
No. of HH members 25–49 1.57 1.64 4.49
No. of HH members 50+ 0.57 0.50 4.13
Years of education 10.70 11.42 11.39
Home ownership 0.43 0.80 38.66
Permanent employment 0.85 0.62 26.07
Years in current job 18.13 17.42 3.58
Employed in enterprise 0.66 0.60 5.90
Occupation dummies
Manager 0.26 0.23 2.84
Director of government departments 0.16 0.15 1.40
Skilled worker 0.42 0.44 1.66
Unskilled worker 0.16 0.18 2.44
Economic sector dummies
Farm, forest and fishery 0.02 0.02 1.04
Mineral 0.41 0.29 12.29
Manufacturing 0.01 0.03 5.35
Electricity, gas, and water supply facilities 0.03 0.04 1.06
Construction 0.06 0.12 11.16
Geological prospec. and irrigation admin. 0.13 0.07 9.03
Transportation, storage, post-office 0.04 0.08 9.98
Wholesale, retail, and food services 0.05 0.05 1.04
Finance and insurance 0.08 0.10 3.55
Real estate 0.03 0.02 2.11
Social services 0.01 0.03 4.31
Health, sports, and social welfare 0.13 0.14 1.82
Education, culture, arts, and mass media 0.01 0.01 3.55
Notes: The fourth column shows the absolute t-value of a standard test of mean difference across the two surveys. Data source: Chinese Household Income
Project (1995, 2002) and authors' calculations.
6 V. Atella et al. / China Economic Review xxx (2015) xxx–xxxownership increased significantly between 1995 and 2002, suggesting a general improvement of the living conditions of the
Chinese population. Moreover, significant changes are observed on several indicators of the job position and occupational
status. The fraction of employees with permanent employment, the fraction of employees working in enterprises and the job
tenure decreased significantly. In addition, in only seven years between 1995 and 2002 the data show significant changes
also in the job sector. The fraction of individuals working in the mineral, real estate and geological prospecting and irrigation
administration decreased significantly, while increased significantly the fraction of individuals working in the construction,
finance and insurance and social services.
3.2. Empirical results
As our aim is to estimate the effect of the 1998 health care reform on the saving rate and OOP expenditure, we adopt a simple
econometric strategy based on the estimation of the following linear reduced form model:Pleas
Chinyi;t ¼ α0 þ α1PIi;t þ α2PRi;t þ α3Dt þ γXi;t þ β1PIi;t  Dt þ β2PRi;t  Dt þ μ i;t ð1Þwhere yi,t is the household i's saving rate or the ratio between out-of-pocket expenses and disposable income, PIi,t is a dummyvariable
representing public insurance coverage (it takes value 1 if the household head is covered by LIS or GIS in 1995, or by BIS in 2002, and
takes value 0 otherwise), PRi,t is a dummy variable indicating private insurance coverage, Dt is the time dummy indicating the pre–
post reform waves, Xi,t is the vector of control variables, which includes household head's demographic characteristics (age and age
square), household's composition variables (number of household members divided by age groups), years of education, home
ownership and employment characteristics (working unit, permanent vs temporary contract, job tenure, occupation and economic
sectors) and the province dummies to take into account geographical heterogeneity. Furthermore, the interaction terms PIi,t ∗ Dt
and PRi,t ∗ Dt should capture the causal effect of the health care reform on outcome variables.
Finally, μi,t is the error term and t refers to time (with t= 1995, 2002).
The coefficient estimates, obtained through simple OLS regressions, are reported in Table 5. Columns from a to c show the estimat-
ed coefficients for OOP expenses–income ratio. Columns from d to f show the estimated coefficients for saving rate. We estimate
different model specifications: the first includes only demographic characteristics and province dummies (columns a and d). Thee cite this article as: Atella, V., et al., The health care system reform in China: Effects on out-of-pocket expenses and saving,
a Economic Review (2015), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.chieco.2015.02.003
Table 5
OLS regressions for out-of-pocket expenses/disposable income ratio and saving rate.
OOP expenses–income Saving rate
Variables (a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f)
Public insurance −0:005
0:004ð Þ
−0:005
0:004ð Þ
−0:004
0:004ð Þ
−0:002
0:011ð Þ
−0:001
0:011ð Þ
−0:006
0:011ð Þ
Private insurance −0:002
0:005ð Þ
−0:002
0:005ð Þ
−0:001
0:005ð Þ
−0:004
0:013ð Þ
−0:004
0:013ð Þ
−0:005
0:013ð Þ
Policy change in 1998 0:036
0:005ð Þ
0:036
0:005ð Þ
 0:035
0:005ð Þ
 0:047
0:013ð Þ
0:039
0:013ð Þ
0:048
0:014ð Þ
Public Ins.*Policy change in 1998 −0:013
0:005ð Þ
−0:013
0:005ð Þ
−0:012
0:006ð Þ
0:052
0:014ð Þ
0:045
0:015ð Þ
0:041
0:015ð Þ
Private Ins.*Policy change in 1998 −0:020
0:009ð Þ
−0:020
0:009ð Þ
−0:019
0:009ð Þ
0:039
0:023ð Þ
0:033
0:023ð Þ
0:027
0:023ð Þ
Gender of head of HH: male 0:002
0:002ð Þ
0:002
0:002ð Þ
0:002
0:002ð Þ
0:006
0:006ð Þ
0:005
0:006ð Þ
0:003
0:006ð Þ
Age of head of HH/100 −0:001
0:016ð Þ
−0:003
0:016ð Þ
0:016
0:018ð Þ
0:025
0:042ð Þ
0:045
0:042ð Þ
0:008
0:047ð Þ
No. of HH members 0–24 0:003
0:002ð Þ
0:003
0:002ð Þ
0:003
0:002ð Þ
−0:030
0:005ð Þ
−0:031
0:005ð Þ
−0:031
0:005ð Þ
No. of HH members 25–49 0:004
0:002ð Þ
 0:004
0:002ð Þ
 0:004
0:002ð Þ
 0:017
0:006ð Þ
0:017
0:006ð Þ
0:017
0:006ð Þ
No. of HH members 50+ 0:007
0:002ð Þ
0:008
0:002ð Þ
0:008
0:002ð Þ
0:027
0:005ð Þ
0:026
0:005ð Þ
0:025
0:005ð Þ
Education years – −0:000
0:000ð Þ
−0:000
0:000ð Þ
– 0:002
0:001ð Þ
0:000
0:001ð Þ
Home ownership – −0:002
0:002ð Þ
−0:002
0:002ð Þ
– 0:032
0:006ð Þ
0:031
0:006ð Þ
Permanent employment – – −0:002
0:003ð Þ
– – 0:011
0:011ð Þ
Employed in enterprises – – −0:005
0:003ð Þ
– – −0:010
0:009ð Þ
Job tenure – – −0:000
0:000ð Þ
– – 0:000
0:000ð Þ
Occupation dummies no no yes no no yes
Economic Sector dummies no no yes no no yes
Province dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes
Constant 0:018
0:010ð Þ
0:022
0:011ð Þ
0:026
0:014ð Þ
 0:082
0:027ð Þ
0:047
0:030ð Þ
0:074
0:037ð Þ
Observations 9499 9499 9499 9499 9499 9499
Notes: ⁎⁎⁎ significance at 1 % level, ⁎⁎ significance at 5 % level, and ⁎ significance at 10 % level. See Table 4 for the occupation dummies and the economic sector
dummies included in the regressions. Data source: Chinese Household Income Project (1995, 2002).
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job characteristics of the household head (columns c and f). 13
According to these results, the effect of the health care reform on the OOP expenses–income ratio (columns a–c) is negative and
statistically significant. Furthermore, we find that the interaction effect with survey year is negative and larger for those who are
covered by private insurance, although the difference is not statistically significant. These results suggest that after the reform, OOP
expenses have increased, but both public insurance and private insurance prove to serve as a cushion against health risks, given
that they do seem to reduce the OOP expenses–income ratio. Furthermore, we find that a larger number of household members
aged 25+ significantly increases the OOP expenses–income ratio. Moreover, years of education and the employment characteristics
do not play any role.
Looking at the saving rate model (columns d–f), the results are in line with those obtained for the OOP expenses–income ratio. In
this case we find that the interaction term between public insurance coverage and post-reform dummy is positive and statistically
significant at 1% and this result is robust acrossmodel specifications. This suggests that the health care reform had an effect on saving
rate for those individuals covered by public health insurance or, put differently, that the public coverage induces households to save
between 4.1 and 5.2 percentage points more than households not covered by any kind of health insurance.
As already mentioned in Section 3.1, our measures of saving rate and out-of-pocket expendituremay be biased if individuals tend
to under-report expenditure consumption and reimbursement and if this under-reporting is heterogeneous across the sample. Fol-
lowing the evidence found by Cifaldi and Neri (2013), to address this pointwe re-estimate themost complete specification by income
tertile, as income may constitute a potential source of heterogeneity in the under-reporting of consumption and reimbursement.
Table 6 shows the results by income tertiles.
Controlling for income tertiles, the results obtained provide a different picture. As far as the results for OOP expenses–income ratio
are concerned, we find that the reform of the public health insurance did not affect the OOP expenses–income ratio (the coefficient of
the interaction effect between health insurance and the policy change dummy is never statistically significant). As far as the results for
saving rate are concerned, we find significant effects of the public health coverage only in the first tertile. Indeed, the coefficient of the
public insurance coverage is negative and statistically significant, while the coefficient of the interaction term between public13 We estimate different model specifications to check whether there are variables driving the effect on OOP expenses–income ratio and saving rate. However, since
the coefficients of the key variables do not change between model specifications, we can conclude that this concern is unfounded.
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China Economic Review (2015), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.chieco.2015.02.003
Table 6
OLS regressions for out-of-pocket expenses/disposable income ratio and saving rate by income tertiles.
OOP expenses–income Saving rate
Variables 1st Ter 2nd Ter 3rd Ter 1st Ter 2nd Ter 3rd Ter
Public insurance −0:001
0:004ð Þ
−0:002
0:011ð Þ
−0:009
0:016ð Þ
−0:041
0:014ð Þ
−0:026
0:023ð Þ
−0:013
0:043ð Þ
Private insurance −0:003
0:005ð Þ
0:008
0:012ð Þ
−0:004
0:017ð Þ
−0:020
0:016ð Þ
−0:019
0:026ð Þ
−0:038
0:046ð Þ
Policy change in 1998 0:038
0:006ð Þ
0:049
0:013ð Þ
0:027
0:016ð Þ
0:009
ð0:018
−0:005
0:026ð Þ
0:018
0:045ð Þ
Public Ins.*Policy change in 1998 −0:009
0:007ð Þ
−0:015
0:013ð Þ
0:005
0:017ð Þ
0:064
0:023ð Þ
0:013
0:028ð Þ
0:021
0:045ð Þ
Private Ins.*Policy change in 1998 −0:031
0:015ð Þ
−0:017
0:020ð Þ
−0:006
0:020ð Þ
−0:002
0:049ð Þ
−0:009
0:042ð Þ
0:053
0:054ð Þ
Gender of head of HH: male 0:005
0:003ð Þ
0:001
0:005ð Þ
−0:004
0:004ð Þ
0:011
0:010ð Þ
0:018
0:010ð Þ
0:007
0:010ð Þ
Age of head of HH/100 0:002
0:024ð Þ
0:013
0:038ð Þ
0:062
0:031ð Þ
−0:081
0:079ð Þ
−0:126
0:080ð Þ
0:071
0:085ð Þ
No. of HH members 0–24 0:001
0:003ð Þ
0:004
0:004ð Þ
0:006
0:003ð Þ
−0:026
0:008ð Þ
 −0:038
0:008ð Þ
−0:049
0:009ð Þ
No. of HH members 25–49 0:006
0:003ð Þ
0:011
0:005ð Þ
0:005
0:004ð Þ
0:012
0:011ð Þ
−0:019
0:010ð Þ
−0:004
0:010ð Þ
No. of HH members 50+ 0:012
0:003ð Þ
0:014
0:005ð Þ
0:007
0:003ð Þ
0:019
0:011ð Þ
−0:004
0:010ð Þ
0:007
0:008ð Þ
Education years 0:001
0:001ð Þ
0:001
0:001ð Þ
0:000
0:001ð Þ
0:000
0:002ð Þ
−0:001
0:002ð Þ
−0:006
0:002ð Þ
Home ownership −0:003
0:003ð Þ
−0:001
0:005ð Þ
−0:000
0:004ð Þ
0:000
0:009ð Þ
0:050
0:010ð Þ
0:030
0:012ð Þ
Permanent employment 0:001
0:003ð Þ
−0:007
0:005ð Þ
0:003
0:004ð Þ
0:005
0:011ð Þ
0:008
0:011ð Þ
0:019
0:012ð Þ
Employed in enterprises −0:002
0:005ð Þ
−0:010
0:007ð Þ
−0:001
0:005ð Þ
−0:006
0:016ð Þ
0:015
0:014ð Þ
−0:028
0:015ð Þ
Job tenure −0:000
0:000ð Þ
−0:000
0:000ð Þ
−0:000
0:000ð Þ
0:001
0:001ð Þ
0:001
0:001ð Þ
−0:001
0:001ð Þ
Occupation dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes
Economic Sector dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes
Province dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes
Constant 0:074
0:023ð Þ
0:036
0:035ð Þ
−0:033
0:031ð Þ
−0:038
0:076ð Þ
0:399
0:073ð Þ
0:357
0:085ð Þ
Observations 3167 3166 3166 3167 3166 3166
Notes: ⁎⁎⁎ significance at 1 % level, ⁎⁎ significance at 5 % level, and ⁎ significance at 10 % level. See Table 4 for the occupation dummies and the economic sector
dummies included in the regressions. Data source: Chinese Household Income Project (1995, 2002).
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low income households with a public insurance save significantly more compared to those not covered.
3.3. Data limitations: dealing with the unobserved heterogeneity
Although the analysis carried out so far presents some interesting policy results, we are aware of the existence of limitations
in our data that may strongly influence the estimates. In particular, our dataset lacks information on individual health status and
both OOP expenses and saving rate are likely to be affected by the individual health status. Therefore, if the health status is an
important determinant of outcomes, this will lead to the existence of some forms of unobserved heterogeneity and our current
estimate of the health insurance coverage effect could, at best, be interpreted as an average effect across individuals with poor
and good health.14
Indeed, evidence of the existence of some unobserved heterogeneity may be seen in Figs. 3 and 4. These figures are kernel density
estimates of the distribution of OLS residuals from our models in Eq. (1). To take into account such unobserved heterogeneity, we
estimate a finite mixture model. Finite Mixture Models (FMMs) are semi-parametric estimators that have received increasing
attention both in the economics and statistics literature because there are different areas inwhich such distributions are encountered.
The FMMs provide a natural representation of heterogeneity in a finite number of latent classes. It concerns modeling any statistical
distribution by a mixture of other distributions.15
Following Deb and Trivedi (1997), the density function for a C-component finite mixture is14 Wh
pieces o
have con
of sick l
15 Atel
Pleas
Chinf yjx; θ1; θ2;…; θC ;π1; π2;…; πCð Þ ¼
XC
j¼1
π j f j hjx; θ j
 
ð2Þat is available in the dataset is the number of sick leave days taken in the current year in 1995 and a measure of self-perceived health status in 2002. These two
f information are not directly comparable to obtain a synthetic and coherent measure of health status variation across the two waves. Theoretically, we could
structed a coherent health status index based on thedistribution of the answers to both questions. However, the large number ofmissing values for thenumber
eave days makes this strategy useless as it would drastically reduce the sample size for the analysis.
la and Deb (2013) provide a review of the contributions adopting the Finite Mixture approach.
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C
j¼1
π j ¼ 1 and fj denotes an appropriate density given the characteristics of the error terms. In this contest nor-
mally distributed components appear to be appropriate in the context of the outcomeof interest.We estimate themodel's parameters
using maximum likelihood. In addition, in post-estimation, we calculate the posterior probability that observation yi belongs to
component c (the prior probability is assumed to be a constant):which
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we use to explore the determinants of class membership, and especially to see if these determinants are consistent with the
at health status is the likely source of unobserved heterogeneity.idea th
Bymeanof theAkaike Information Criterion andBayesian Information Criterionwe select a two class FMM. Parameter estimates of
the finite mixture model by income tertiles for OOP expenses–income ratio (columns a and b) and saving rate (columns c and d) are
reported in Table 7. Differently fromOLS estimates, our findings suggest that, accounting for some forms of unobserved heterogeneity
(potentially induced by health status), out-of-pocket expenses and saving rate are affected by the reform in a differentiated way. In
particular, we find that the ratio between out-of-pocket expenses and income increases more for individuals belonging to the first
class compared to those in the second class, for all income tertiles. On the contrary, the saving rate increases only for class 1 individuals
in the first tertile and only for class 2 individuals in the third tertile.
Furthermore, we find that, after the reform of the public insurance, only class 2 individuals with high income (in the third tertile)
have been cushioned against the increase in out-of-pocket expenses. On the contrary, in the case of the saving rate we find significant
effects only for low income individuals (in the first tertile) in class 2.
These results support the prima facie evidence that the estimated class probabilities are informative vis-à-vis our speculative
hypothesis that the distributions are drawn from individuals with poor health and good health, with the evidence suggesting that
component 1 represents individuals with poor health. The posterior probabilities seem to support our hypothesis: in the model foressions for out-of-pocket expenses/disposable income ratio and saving rate by income tertiles.
OOP expenses–income Saving rate
ncome tertile Comp: 1
(a)
Comp: 2
(b)
Comp: 1
(c)
Comp: 2
(d)
insurance −0.010 −0.002 −0.025⁎⁎ −0.96⁎
e insurance −0.028 −0.001 −0.023 0.011
change in 1998 0.069⁎⁎⁎ 0.009⁎⁎⁎ 0.057⁎⁎⁎ −0.147⁎⁎
Ins.*Policy change in 1998 −0.009 −0.000 0.022 0.229⁎⁎
e Ins.*Policy change in 1998 −0.064 −0.008⁎ 0.105⁎⁎ −0.035
0.127 0.018 0.323 0.153
0.173 0.827 0.212 0.788
d income tertile Comp: 1
(a)
Comp: 2
(b)
Comp: 1
(c)
Comp: 2
(d)
insurance 0.021 −0.003 −0.110 −0.010
e insurance 0.026 −0.000 0.123 −0.039⁎
change in 1998 0.154⁎ 0.010⁎⁎⁎ −0.105 0.004
Ins.*Policy change in 1998 −0.097 −0.000 0.085 0.011
e Ins.*Policy change in 1998 −0.116 −0.001 −0.127 0.011
0.255 0.017 0.171 0.309
0.139 0.861 0.133 0.867
income tertile Comp: 1
(a)
Comp: 2
(b)
Comp: 1
(c)
Comp: 2
(d)
insurance 0.062 0.101⁎⁎⁎ −0.149 0.032
e insurance 0.076 0.103⁎⁎⁎ −0.224 0.013
change in 1998 0.165⁎⁎⁎ 0.112⁎⁎⁎ −0.204 0.077⁎
Ins.*Policy change in 1998 −0.053 −0.105⁎⁎⁎ 0.189 −0.035
e Ins.*Policy change in 1998 −0.100 −0.105 0.299 −0.021
0.186 0.014 0.175 0.333
0.173 0.827 0.204 0.796
⁎⁎ significance at 1 % level, ⁎⁎ significance at 5 % level, and ⁎ significance at 10 % level.
ressions include the same set of regressors as Table 5, columns c and f. Data source: Chinese Household Income Project (1995, 2002).
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third income tertiles), while in the saving rate equation the same probabilities are 21.0, 13.3, and 20.4%.
Althoughwe have not been able to obtain information on the health distribution for a population that is perfectly overlappingwith
our population, we feel comfortable to claim that the posterior probabilities are consistentwith some recent findings on health status
distribution available in the literature (Chatterji et al., 2008; Mu, 2013; Strauss et al., 2011; Zhao, 2008). In particular, according to
Zhao (2008) 26.0% of the whole sample reported a poor and fair health status ranging from 34.8% in the Hubei province and 13.4%
in Heilongjiang. Chatterji et al. (2008) show that 16.0% of the respondents in China reported having at least one chronic disease.
Strauss et al. (2011) find that 22.0% of women and 30.0% of men reported poor general health. Finally, Mu (2013) finds that 24.0%
of the sample self-reports a poor health status. Given that our sample is younger than the samples used by the authors listed
above, we can reasonably infer that class 1 represents the group of individuals with poor health.
To better characterize class membership, for both OOP expenses–income ratio and saving rate we run OLS regressions of the
posterior probabilities (multiplied by 100) of belonging to class 1 on a set of variables including age, sex, years of education and a
set of job characteristics (working unit, type of contract). The results presented in Table 8 support the poor health/good health cate-
gorization. In both equations the coefficients of age is positive and statistically significant, suggesting, as expected, that aging is asso-
ciated with the worsening of health status. Moreover, the coefficients of working in an enterprise and with permanent employment
contract are negative, suggesting that poorer familieswith household head employedwith temporary contract aremore likely to have
a poor general healthwith respect towealthier families with household head employedwith a permanent contract andworking in an
enterprise.
We conclude this section by comparing our findings with previous evidence on the effects achieved by the reform in terms of
reduction of out-of-pocket expenditures. Existing evidence in the literature is still mixed and contradictory. Several studies doc-
ument that out-of-pocket expenses increased as a consequence of the reform. Among the others, Liu and Zhao (2006), using data
from the pilot experiment conducted in Zhenjiang, found that the introduction of the BIS led to an increase in out-of-pocket pay-
ments. Nevertheless, redistributions in out-of-pocket payments appear to favor disadvantaged groups, suggesting more equita-
ble cost-sharing within BIS. Yip and Hsiao (2009), using data from the National Health Survey, reports that the out-of-pocket
expenses associated with a single inpatient admission increased from 70 to 80% of per capita income in 1993 to more than
200% in 2003. Using data from three different household surveys spanning the period 1991–2004 and covering half of China's
32 provinces, Wagstaff and Lindelow (2008) found that the insurance reform typically increased expected out-of-pocket
payments and the risk of large out-of-pocket payments. This occurs because insurance may encourage the use of higher-level
providers, which in turn may lead to higher out-of-pocket spending. On the contrary, Liu et al. (2008) found that the incidence
of catastrophic payments (defined as health spending exceeding 30% of capacity to pay) fell in urban areas between 1998 and
2003. Nevertheless, their results suggest that people with low income have an increased probability of undergoing catastrophic
medical spending.
Our findings contribute to this debate. Analyzing the results achieved by the reform in terms of reduction of out-of-pocket
expenditure by income levels and controlling for potential unobserved heterogeneity due to health status, we find that the coefficient
of the interaction term between public health insurance and policy change dummy is negative and statistically significant only for
high income households (the third tertile) and only for individuals belonging to the second group, i.e. those in good health status.
Actually, this result is worrisome, as it suggests that the public health coverage after the reform provides financial protection only
to individuals that are relatively better off (with good health status and high income).3.4. Other limitations of the study
In this paper we focus on the 1998 health care system reform and we analyze a pre- and post-reform (the CHIP 1995 and 2002
waves). However, during the period 1995–2002, changes in other policies occurred as well, both in the welfare system and in the
access of households to real and financial asset markets (e.g. housing market). All these reforms can affect the wellbeing of the
urban residents and lead to changes in their expenditures and savings. Unfortunately these confounding factors may not be easily
controlled for in our empirical analysis. Nevertheless, it is important to highlight how also the other reforms might have contributed
to changes of the household saving, togetherwith that in thehealth sector. For this reason, in this sectionwe present the key aspects of
the pension system and the housing market reforms.Table 8
OLS estimates of the correlates of the posterior probabilities.
OOP expenses–income Saving rate
Variables 1st Ter 2nd Ter 3rd Ter 1st Ter 2nd Ter 3rd Ter
Gender of head of HH: male 1.518 0.484 −0.746 1.489 0.039 −0.869
Age 0.144⁎⁎ 0.169⁎⁎ 0.271⁎⁎ 0.109⁎⁎ 0.069⁎ −0.011
Education years −0.106 −0.162 −0.034 0.050 −0.011 −0.000
Permanent employment −4.152⁎⁎⁎ −3.736⁎⁎⁎ −6.133⁎⁎⁎ −0.956⁎ 0.621 0.505
Employed in enterprise −1.929 1.576 −0.449 −1.686⁎ 0.987 0.930
Notes: ⁎⁎⁎ significance at 1 % level, ⁎⁎ significance at 5 % level, and ⁎ significance at 10 % level. Data source: Chinese Household Income Project (1995, 2002).
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substitute for private saving, hence it is essential to look at the social security provisions and welfare reforms to disentangle the
different motives for saving.
China's national urban pension systemwas put in place in 1951 and it was initially based uniquely on the employer contributions.
The systemwas Pay As You Go (PAYG) and replaced about 75–90% of the employee's wage. This enterprise-based system lasted until
the mid-1990s, when the burden on companies became too large. In 1997 the Chinese Government launched a major reform estab-
lishing a three pillars pension system. The first pillar consists on a payroll tax on the employer of 17% such that workers with 15 years
of contributions had a replacement rate of 20%. The second pillar is based on both employer's and employee's contributions (11% total
contribution of which 3% paid by the employer while the rest is paid by the employee). The third pillar consists on voluntary
contributions.
The reform also introduces gradual changes on the benefit provision according to seniority: i) individuals retired before 1997 (the
so called “old workers”) would receive benefits according to the old PAYG regime; ii) those who have not yet retired but working be-
fore 1997 (“middle workers”) were in a transitional plan with rules based on a pro-rata system; individuals who started work after
1997 (the so called “new workers”), who would be under the three pillars regime (Herd, Hu, & Koen, 2010; Impavido, Hu, & Li,
2009; OECD, 2010). According to the reform, the “old workers” had a very generous treatment with respect to the “new workers”
as no contributions were required from the employee and replacement rates were very high. In the same period, many large-scale
SOEs provided immediate pensions to laid-off workers even at quite young ages.
To take into account the potential effect of the pension reform on saving, we estimated Eq. (1) by cohort. We divided the sample
into three cohorts (born between 1937 and 1948, 1949 and 1959, 1960 and 1970) andwe run three different regressions, considering
themost complete specification. The results, not shown but available upon request, show that the effect of the public health insurance
on household saving is positive and statistical significant for the youngest and oldest cohorts, while is not significant for the second
cohort (household heads born between 1949 and 1959).
Another major reform that may have affected the household saving is the reform of the housingmarket, which began in 1980
and completely transformed a centrally planned public housing system into a market-oriented housing industry. Before the re-
form, housing was treated as a component of social welfare and was provided mostly for free by government institutions and
SOEs. The first stage of the housing reform started in 1980 and in 1988 the central government established a nationwide housing
market: the public housing units throughout the country started to be sold to their sitting tenant at heavily discounted prices.
The second stage of the housing reform started in 1994with the issue of a regulatory document which established a comprehen-
sive framework to facilitate the development of both supply side and demand side of the housingmarket. On the supply side, the
government decided to build a multi-layer housing provision system for different income groups. On the demand side, a dual
housing finance system was established to combine both social saving and private saving (Wang & Murie, 2000). Potential
home buyers could apply for commercial mortgage loans offered by financial institutions and for subsidized mortgage loans
through a housing saving program called Housing Provident Fund (HPF). This programwas formally mandatory for Government
agency, public institutions, SOEs, urban collective enterprises, foreign-invested enterprises, urban private enterprises and other
urban enterprises, but in 2002 only about 60% of employees actually joined the program. Within the HPF program, both the em-
ployer and employee contribute a certain percentage of the employees' salaries (between 4% and 10%) to an individual account.
This program combines a 401(k)-like savings and retirement account with subsidized mortgage rates and price discounts to
provide a mechanism through which an employee could save for a housing purchase (Buttimer, Gu, & Yang, 2004). Intuitively,
the HPF program might have a twofold effect on household saving. On the one hand, it could have an indirect effect through its
impact on the decision to own a house or on the intention to purchase a house in the future. On the other hand, it might have a
direct effect on saving, and the sign of the effect could be in principle both positive and negative. Indeed, the HPF might work as
an alternative source of finance because it allows to access loans with a low interest rate. In this case, the effects of HPF on saving
are negative. At the contrary, HPF might also work as a way to motivate the accumulation of financial sources to purchase
houses. In this case, the effects of HPF on saving are positive.
To take into account the potential effect of the housing reform on saving, we estimated Eq. (1) by adding a dummy variable for
participation to the program of any household member and its interaction with survey year. The results, not shown but available
upon request, show that the effect of the public health insurance on household saving is robust to the inclusion of these additional
controls.
4. Conclusion
In this paperwe have analyzed the economic effects of the third stage of the health care system reform occurred in 1998, when the
Chinese government established a new public insurance scheme, called the Basic Insurance Scheme (BIS) nationwide. In particular,
we have focused on the effects produced on OOP expenses and household's saving rate.
Using data from the 1995 and 2002 waves of the Chinese Household Income Project Survey for the Chinese urban households, we
have estimated an empirical model to explore the effect of the 1998 reform. According to a first set of results based on OLS technique,
the reform has negatively affected OOP expenses and positively affected saving rate. Furthermore, this first set of results suggest that
both public insurance and private insurance prove to serve as a cushion against health risks, given that they do seem to reduce the
ratio of OOP expenses compared to disposable income.
As these results may be biased due to the presence of self-selection in the adoption of insurance schemes and to unobserved
heterogeneity related to health status, we use a Finite Mixture Model on population subsamples according to income tertiles. InPlease cite this article as: Atella, V., et al., The health care system reform in China: Effects on out-of-pocket expenses and saving,
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12 V. Atella et al. / China Economic Review xxx (2015) xxx–xxxthis way we are able to isolate, by income tertiles, two distinct groups that, according to posterior probability regression estimates,
could be associated with “bad” and “good” health status. Once properly accounted for this form of heterogeneity and for self-
selection, the effects of the reform are quite different. In particular, we find that after the reform out-of-pocket expenses decrease
only for individuals with good health status at the top of the income distribution (the less vulnerable) and the saving rate increases
only for individuals with good health status at the bottom of the income distribution.
Overall, our results are somewhat surprising if compared with the standard literature developed for Western economies. Once
attention is paid to the income distribution and to the different populations reflected in the sample vis-à-vis the different health
characteristics, the role of public health provisions in protecting against current and future health shocks almost disappears. We can-
not say much about the specific reason for this failure, but a possible explanation is the reduced coverage for dependent household
members (spouse and children of the employee).
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